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This paper explores four empirical relationshipsreflecting the impact of foreign trade on the
employmentof unskilled workers:(i) the direct relationshipbetween net exports and embodied
education of the corresponding goods; (ii) the changes in domestic prices accompanying
changes in net exports; (iii) the relationshipbetween real or potential import competitionand
defensive measures such as more investment or increasing the skill level of the labor force;
and (iv) the relationshipbetween foreign trade and domestic prices. None of these exercises
suggests that foreign tradehas much impact on the employmentof less skilled U.S. workers.

1. Introduction
At first glance, it seems unlikely that foreign trade should have a significant impact on the
employment of unskilled U.S. workers. For example, imports from non-OPEC low-wage nations
amount to less than 2% of the GDP.' Furthermore, as shown elsewhere (Pryor and Schaffer
1998), the number of jobs for prime-age workers (ages 25-49) in the United States that requires
a high school diploma or less has increased at a faster rate than the number of workers in this
age bracket with the corresponding educational credentials.
However, does the foreign trade sector really have such a benign impact? Over the last
two decades, the relative importance of foreign trade in the U.S. economy has roughly doubled,
and imports from developing countries have grown even faster. Simultaneously, the rates of
employment of prime-age men with only a high school education or less have fallen, real wages
among employed but less educated workers have fallen, and wage differences between workers
with different levels of education have increased.
Attention to the linkage between foreign trade and labor market trends is part of a broader
debate on whether the falling wages and employment rates of less educated male workers in
the United States are due to skill-biased technical change or to foreign trade. In the fields of
* Departmentof Economics,SwarthmoreCollege, Swarthmore,PA 19081, USA; E-mail
fpryorl@swarthmore.edu.
Several people generouslysupplieddata used in this essay, and I am gratefulto David Schafferfor the education
data from the CurrentPopulationSurvey, WayneG. Gray for supplyingin advanceof publicationthe Bartelsman-Gray
data bank on the manufacturingsector,and RobertFeenstrafor advancecopies of his data on U.S. exportsand imports.
I also appreciatethe helpful remarkson previousdraftsof this essay from RichardN. Cooper,JanetCeglowski, Steven
Golub, StephenA. O'Connell,ZoraPryor,and an unknownreferee.Data underlyingTables 1-3 can be found at my Web
site: www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/fpryorl/.
Received October 1997; acceptedJune 1998.
By low-wage nations,I include all LatinAmericannationsplus all non-OPECnationsof Africa and Asia except Israel,
Japan,and South Africa. In 1994, such importsamountedto 1.8%of the GDP or, using as the denominatoronly the
GDP originatingfrom the manufacturing,agricultural,and mining sectors of the economy, 9.0%. The data for this
calculationare from Survey of CurrentBusiness 76, nos. 7 and 8 (U.S. Departmentof Commerce 1996).
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both labor economics and internationaleconomics, various economists place quite different
weights on these two factors.2
For example, in this debate among foreign tradeeconomists, some, such as Lawrenceand
Slaughter (1993), find little empirical linkage between these foreign trade and labor market
trends. Others, such as Bhagwati and Dehijia (1994), question on theoreticalgrounds the empirical relevance of the factor content argumentslinking trade and domestic employment in
manufacturing.Moreover,if labor markets function properly,foreign trade should have little
overall employment effect, although the shift of unskilled workers from import-competingindustries to other industriesmight place a downwardpressureon their wages.
By way of contrast,Wood (1994, 1995) finds considerableemploymentand wage effects
due in large measureto the increasingimportsof noncompetinggoods that are highly unskilledlabor intensive. He furthershows that among nationsof the OECD, a stronginverse relationship
exists between the decline in their share of manufacturingworkers in the labor force and the
increase in net imports of manufacturersfrom developing nations as a ratio of their GDP.
Theoretical argumentsabout employment effects of foreign trade on unskilled workers focus
on imperfectionsin the labor market.For example, import penetrationplaces downwardpressures on U.S. prices of goods, which are unskilled-laborintensive and which compete with
imports from low-wage nations. Such pressures are in turn transmittedto wages of the U.S.
workersin these industries.If the U.S. wages in these industriesare sticky or if theirequilibrium
levels sink below the minimum wage, U.S. producerscan no longer profitablyemploy their
labor force. Alternatively, if the wages of U.S. unskilled workers in affected industries sink
below their reservation wage, they would voluntarily leave their employers and perhaps the
labor market.In either case, if wages in other U.S. industriesare also downwardlysticky, such
displaced workersmight never find alternativeemployment.
It is difficult to sort through these various competing theoretical and empirical claims
regarding employment and wages of unskilled U.S. workers and to decide which tests are
decisive. In this essay, I focus mainly on employmenttrends, as the causal forces underlying
employment are easier to disentanglethan those for wages. Further,a more exclusive focus on
employment issues allows some crucial new empirical evidence to be introduced.The major
conclusion is that foreign tradehas relatively little impact on the employmentof less educated
workers, even in import-competingindustries.I reach this result from the explorationof four
hypotheses linking trade and the employmentof unskilled U.S. workers:
(i) Over the long run, net imports of the United States have increased, especially in those
industrialbranchesthat are characterizedby a high percentageof unskilled workersin their
labor force. Although this has occurredin certain well-known cases, I find no evidence to
supportthe notion that this has been a general tendency for the manufacturingsector as a
whole.
(ii) Over the long run, prices in unskilled-labor-intensivebranchesof industrythat are vulnerable to importpenetrationhave risen less than in otherbranchesof industriesonce domestic
shocks such as differential changes in productivityare taken into account. I also find no
empirical supportfor this hypothesis.
(iii) Over the long run, productivity and investment in unskilled-labor-intensivebranches of
2 Cline (1997) has a magisterialreview of the literature.Wood (1994) has an earlier yet useful summaryas well. The
variousessays in the symposiaon income inequalityand tradein the Journal of Economic Perspectives9, no. 3(Summer
1995), provide additionalinsights.

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 20:14:39 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

474

Frederic L. Pryor

industries have increased more rapidly than other branches to meet potential competition
from imports.This hypothesis receives no empiricalconfirmation.
(iv) Importsare increasingmost rapidlyat the "low end of the market"and for productswhose
import prices are generally increasing less rapidly than prices of domestic productionfor
the same productcategory. The low end of the marketconsists of those goods in a given
productline that are most unskilled-laborintensive.Althoughthe data on these mattersleave
much to be desired, the empiricalevidence does not appearpromising.
If trade does not account for much of the fall of employment rates of unskilled male
workers,then what does? The final section of this paper briefly surveys several other possible
culprits.

2. The Data and a Methodological

Issue

Like others working on this topic, I use the NBER databases for trade and production,
recently updatedby Bartelsmanand Gray (1996) and Feenstra(1997). Most investigatorshave
used as a proxy of unskilled to skilled labor in a given industrythe ratio of productionworkers
to nonproductionworkers. Many of those skeptical of the relationshipbetween trade and unemploymentfind this proxy an imperfectsolution, especially because many productionworkers
are considerablymore skilled and educatedthan office clerks classified as nonproductionworkers. In the tables in this paper,I use both this proxy and a more direct measure, namely, the
average years of formal educationof all workersin an occupationor an industry.3I also carry
out regression experimentsusing average wages as anotherproxy for skill. Because I reached
the same conclusions with the wage variable as with the other two proxies, I do not discuss
these results further.Several additionalmethodologicalissues also requireour immediateattention.
First, should we calculate only the skills directly embodied in various domestically produced goods, or should we use some type of input-outputtable and calculate both direct and
indirectlyembodied skills? On this topic, Feenstraand Hanson (1996a, b) contend stronglythat
focusing only on the skills directly embodied in various domestically producedgoods misses
the impact of increased outsourcingabroad.This trend, which was especially importantin the
period 1979-1990, allows a firm to focus its domestic efforts only on skilled-laborintensive
parts of their productionand to import unskilled-laborintensive inputs, a strategythat allows
them to stave off importpenetration.From this we can infer that importpenetrationshould be
inversely relatedto skill intensityof productionof domesticproduction.More specifically,those
industriesthat have upgradedtheir production,either by changing their productionmethods or
partsof theirproductionprocess, have experiencedless
by outsourcingunskilled-labor-intensive
import penetrationthan other industries.In Table 1, I specifically test this hypothesis and find
no empirical evidence to suggest that this effect is statistically significant.4Moreover,when I
3Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and Sachs and Shatz (1994) present the case for equating nonproductiveand
productiveworkerswith skilled and unskilledworkers.Table 1 shows that both this proxy and a more direct measure
of skill yield about the same results.
4 Feenstraand Hanson (1996a, b) also focus their econometricattentionsolely on imports.In this paper,I also account
for exports and deal with changes of net exports (exportsminus imports)to productionratherthan importpenetration
alone.
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Table 1. The Impactof Skill Intensity of Productionon the Change in Net Exports (WeightedRegressions)
Low-SkilledWorkers,1971
Constant

Average Annual Change of
Low-Skilled Workers,1971-1991

Percentageof LessPercentageof
Percentageof LessPercentageof
EducatedWorkers ProductionWorkers EducatedWorkers ProductionWorkers

Labor-CapitalRa
A
Aver
C
Ratio in 1971
19

DependentVariable:Change in Ratio of Net Exports to Domestic Consumption, 1971-1991
Two-Digit IndustrialClassification
-0.0586

(0.1497)
-0.0332
(0.1072)

+0.1119

-

(0.1697)

2.166

- 1.618*

+1

(3.976)

(0.437)
- 1.656*
(0.422)

(1
+0
(1

- 1.405*

+0

- 1.184
(3.953)

+0.0089
(0.1501)

Three-DigitIndustrialClassification
+0.1905

(0.0811)

-0.1662

+0.1471*

(0.0804)

(1.328)
-0.1468

(0.0606)
Four-DigitIndustrialClassification
+0.0641

+ 2.210

(0.0933)
(0.0795)
-0.0684

(0.1062)

- 1.554

(2.130)
- 1.539

(3.079)

(0.306)

(0

- 1.265*

+0

(0.297)

(0

-0.7158

(0.3803)

-2.

(0

Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated regression coefficients; statistical significance at the 0.05 level is indicated

serve as weights. Because of a controversyabout measurement,I omit SIC 357 (office, accounting,computingequipment)and SIC 3573

come from Feenstra (1996, 1997), the industrial data from the Bartelsman-Gray (1996) database, and the education data from the Current
the SIC classification used for the trade and production data. This adjustment is described in Pryor and Schaffer (1998).
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examine the entire structureof industryin a quite differentway in Table 5, I also find no such
effect.
Second, how can we interpretchanges in total (direct and indirect)requirementsof skilled
and unskilled labor?This issue comes sharplyinto focus when we comparedirect and indirect
requirementsof good A for a dollar's worth of productionof good B over a period of more
than a decade and a half.5The changes have been enormous,and, combined with the important
shifts in the structureof imports, we have a problem in interpretingthe relevant regression
coefficients. That is, we do not know what is the key causal force, whether it is changes in
productionmethods in the industryunderexamination,in the domestic industriessupplyingthe
inputs, or in the outsourcing abroad. If we focus only on direct requirementsof skilled and
unskilled labor,the causal relation is clear, and the impact of outsourcingabroadis picked up
by directly examiningnet importpenetrationof those productsused as inputs in the production
of other goods.
Third,what tradevariableshould be explained?In this paper,I focus on the change of net
exports(exports - imports)to domesticconsumption(domesticshipments+ imports- exports)
of the various productbranches.Such an approachseems appropriatebecause it capturesmost
fully the basic idea of the Heckscher-Ohlinapproachtowardtrade,namely, thatit is the contrast
between the factor endowmentof domestic productionversus potentialimportsthat determines
whether net exports in that industry are positive or negative. If, by way of contrast,we focus
on the gross levels of trade, we introduceadditionalissues of interindustrytrade that, insofar
as the goods are relatively similar,take us far from the factor-proportion
hypothesesthat we are
alternative
of
such
results
the
test.6
For
to
approachto allow interpretation,
any
empirical
trying
be
need
to
would
its underlying theoreticaljustification
carefully spelled out and linked to
particularcausal variables.It should also be noted that in section 5 of this paper,I do attempt
to analyze empirically some of the key issues arising in cases in which interindustrytrade
representsquite differentgoods with differentfactor proportions.

3. Long-Term Changes in Net Exports in Low-Skill-Intensive

Industries

Is net import penetrationover the long term increasing fastest in those industriescharacterized by low-skilled workers?The initial year for the comparisonis 1971, two years before
the first oil shock; the end year is 1991, a roughly comparableyear in terms of the business
cycle. In both years, comparabledata on trade,production,and the characteristicsof industrial
branchesare available.
I try to explain changes in the net exports to domestic consumptionin the initial and final
years and to relate these changes to the initial state and changes in such explanatoryvariables
as total factor productivity,the general labor intensity of production(measuredby the laborcapital ratio), and the relative importanceof unskilled workers. Such a specificationallows us
5 A descriptionof the method of comparisoncan be obtainedon request.

6 In other words, the use of net
exportsdoes not distinguishbetween cases in which net exportsare the same, but in one

case the volume of both is considerable,whereasin the othercase the volume of both is small. Nevertheless,if domestic
productionand importsare roughlythe same in quality and productionmethods,the Heckscher-Ohlinapproachwould
lead us to suspect that the two cases should have the same net impacton domestic employment.I presentsome results
of experimentsof the two approachesin several footnotesfor those who are curiousabouthow this alternativeapproach
would affect my main conclusions.
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to separatethe particularimpact of trade on the total labor force and on the less skilled labor
force. I measure unskilled labor by two variables:the percentageof workers in each industry
with only a high school education or less (available only on a three-digitbasis) and the share
of productionworkersin the total labor force.
According to the hypothesis under examination,both the initial state and the change over
time of the unskilled labor variables should be inversely related to the change in the ratio of
net exports to domestic consumption.For the results of such an exercise to be meaningful,it
is necessary to assume that rankingsof the ratios of skilled and unskilled workersin different
productionbranchesare roughly the same in the United States and its tradepartners.Although
I have no direct evidence on this matter,it seems a reasonableassumption,given the convergence of manufacturingtechnology throughoutthe world.
It would be desirable, of course, to hold both domestic and foreign productivitychanges
constantin these experiments.Unfortunately,data on foreign productivitychanges are not available, and data on changes in domestic total factorproductivityalone add little to the explanatory
power of the regressions.Moreover,the calculatedcoefficients of total factorproductivitygrowth
are the wrong sign and are usually not statisticallysignificant.
Finally, I carry out these regression exercises with data at different levels of aggregation
to isolate the effects of various aggregationbiases. The various industriesincluded in the regression analysis are weighted by their value of shipments,although,I might add, unweighted
regressionsyield quite similar results.
The results of these calculations, reportedin Table 1, can be quickly summarized.Most
important,in none of the five regressions is the coefficient for the variable representingthe
relative importanceof unskilled workers in the industry statistically significant.7Part of the
explanationof such results lies in the fact that at higher levels of aggregationthe variationin
the share of the less educatedworkersis relatively low. For example, in the 71 industriesunder
considerationat a three-digitlevel, the coefficient of variation(the ratioof the standarddeviation
to the mean) of this ratio is only 12.4%.Roughly the same results are obtainedwhen the average
wage in the industryand the average annualchange in these wages are used as proxies for the
skill variables.
Most of the calculatedcoefficients for the labor-capitalvariableare statisticallysignificant.
In other words, U.S. net exports increasedrelatively more in those industriescharacterizedby
low labor intensity or in which the labor intensity is falling relatively faster. To look at the
results from a different perspective, import penetrationwas having the most adverse effect on
those industries with labor intensive methods of production,and the skill mix within those
industrieswas relatively unimportant.
Therefore,the factor-proportionargumentseems to have validity, but only regardingaggregate labor and capital and not differentsubcategoriesof labor.Differentialunemploymentof
unskilled workers could occur as a secondary effect, of course, but only if the unemployed
high-skilled workers startcompeting for the jobs previously held by the less skilled workers.
Two obvious objections to this procedurecan be raised. First, such an exercise does not
focus on the possibility that unskilled-labor-intensiveindustriesmight have adopted defensive
7 Following the suggestionof one of the referees,I also calculatedthe regressionsusing otherdependentvariables,namely,
the ratios of total importsand total trade (exportsplus imports)to domestic consumptionratherthan net exports.The
resultsare what we mightexpect and do not change any conclusionsreachedin the text. More specifically,the calculated
coefficients for the less educatedworkersor productionworkersare also not statisticallysignificant,and, moreover,the
coefficients of determinationare lower as well.
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measuresto preventimportpenetration.For example, they might have upgradedthe skill levels
of their labor force, substitutedcapital for unskilled labor, or outsourcedlabor-intensivesegments of the productionprocess. However,the resultsin Table 1 suggest thatthis is not occurring
because the calculated coefficients of the change in the percentageof less skilled workers or
the change in the labor-capital ratios are not statistically significant nor often with even the
correct sign. When the average wage is used as a proxy for skill, similar results are obtained.
In short, the addition of variables representing "defensive measures" add little explanatory
power, their calculated coefficients are generally not statistically significant, and they do not
lead to greatly differentcoefficients of the other variables.I deal with this issue more directly
and at greaterlength in section 4.
Second, the regressionexercise reportedin Table 1 says nothing about the problemof the
impact of noncompetingimports,which Wood (1994, 1995) has so stronglyemphasized.However, two conflicting aspects of the regressionresults are relevantto this problem:
First, the degree of explanatorypower (R2)of these regressionsdecreases as the degree of
disaggregationincreases. At higher levels of aggregation,other causal variablesthat influence
changes in net export appearto be correlatedwith the factorson which I am focusing. However,
as we disaggregateand move closer to the actualgoods being traded,these correlationsbecome
less important.This works against the noncompetingimport hypothesis, which is concerned
with highly specific goods within a productline. The results in Table 2 suggest that as the data
focus more sharplyon specific products,the unskilled labor hypothesis has almost no explanatory value.
Second, as the data become increasingly disaggregated,the calculated coefficient for the
variable describing the initial importanceof unskilled labor in productionof the various production branches becomes increasingly negative. Because the predicted relationshipbetween
this variable and the change in net exports is negative, such a result offers support for the
noncompetingimporthypothesis.
The conflicting results of the previous two paragraphssuggest that if the noncompeting
import hypothesis has validity, it would explain little of the changing patternof net exports at
a highly disaggregatedlevel. I focus more directly on this matterin section 5.
The most importantmessage is that the regressionexperimentsprovide no direct evidence
to supportthe propositionthat the U.S. trade patternhas shifted against those industriescharacterizedas unskilled-laborintensive. Nevertheless, some indirectevidence is also importantto
examine.

4. Trade and Prices
Increasing foreign trade can cause changes in internationalprices that in turn lead to
changing factor returns.According to the simple version of the Stolper-Samuelsontheorem,
these circumstanceslead to higher returnsto the relatively abundantfactor and lower returns
to the relatively scarce factor.
In comparison to the rest of the world, the United States has a relative abundanceof
educated, skilled workersand a relative scarcity of less educated or unskilled workers.This is
suggested by the fact that U.S. exports embody a much higherratio of skilled laborto unskilled
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Table 2. The Relation of Domestic Price Changes to Tradeand ProductivityChanges, 19711991 (WeightedRegressions)
Constant

Change in Ratio of
Net Exportsto Domestic
Consumption

Average Annual
Change in Total
FactorProductivity

Coefficientof
Determination(R2)

Sample Size

DependentVariable:Annual Average Change in Prices of Domestic Shipments
Two-Digit IndustrialClassification
+0.0344
+0.0570*
-1.581*
0.8353
20
(0.0013)
(0.0216)
(0.198)
Three-DigitIndustrialClassification
+0.0561*
+0.0231
-1.314*
0.6256
71
(0.0125)
(0.134)
(0.0010)
Four-DigitIndustrialClassification
+0.0567*
-0.0007
-1.020*
0.7041
449
(0.0004)
(0.0014)
(0.031)
DependentVariable:Average AnnualChangein Double-DeflatedPrices of Domestic Shipments
Two-Digit IndustrialClassification
+0.0302
+0.0560*
-1.377*
0.6770
20
(0.0017)
(0.0292)
(0.268)
Three-DigitIndustrialClassification
+0.0552*
+0.0439*
-1.642*
0.7224
70
(0.0010)
(0.0124)
(0.140)
Four-DigitIndustrialClassification
+0.0551*
-0.00008
-1.545*
0.6652
444
(0.0007)
(0.00229)
(0.053)
Standarderrorsare in parentheses;statisticalsignificanceat the 0.05 level is indicatedby asterisks.The average
values of shipmentsserve as weights. For other notes, see Table 1.

labor than its imports or its manufacturingproductionfor domestic consumption.8Otherthings
being equal, the simple version of the Stolper-Samuelsontheorempredictsthat increasingtrade
over the last two decades should have led to a relative increase in exports of skill-intensive
goods, to a relative increase in the price of those goods and services, and to a relative increase
in the wages of skilled versus unskilled workers.9These price and wage movements are importantto the argumentabout falling employmentrates of less skilled workersfor the argument
outlined in the introduction.By focusing on prices ratherthan wages, it is possible to isolate
the impactof tradefrom otherfactorsinfluencingwages and, moreover,to deal with the StolperSamuelson theorem on its own turf and with its own set of assumptions.
However,this propositionis based on some very strictassumptions,and the simple version
may not hold. Indeed, the real-worldrelevance of this propositionand its intellectual cousins
have been often challenged,for example, by Bhagwatiand Dehejia (1994) and Berman,Machin,
8 Pryor (1996) presentsdata on this phenomenon.
9 Variouseconomists have pointed out that the introductionof additionalfactors of productionor nontradedgoods into
a Stolper-Samuelsonmodel can result in perverse effects in industrializednations in which the fall of trade barriers
throughoutthe world and an increase in both exports and importscan result in the relative fall of wages of the most
abundantfactor (in this case, skilled labor). Examples would occur if the new imports are substitutesfor nontraded
goods thatare skilled-laborintensiveor if the new exportsare raw-materialintensiveand if these industriesareunskilledlabor intensive.
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and Bound (1996). Nevertheless, it provides a useful frameworkfor examining whether the
prices and wages in those industrieswith relativelyhighersharesof unskilledworkersare falling
in comparison to those industries producing more skill-intensive goods and services. Others
have carried out such investigations, but the regression analysis that follows includes several
innovations.'0It is useful to carry out the analysis with two models.
The most relevantprice changes to examine are those of domesticprices, as these determine
wages, not the prices of imports." In the calculationsin Table 2, the variableto be explained
is the average annual price increase during the two decades between 1971 and 1991. Cooper
(1997) has correctlypointed out that instead of the price change of shipmentsper se, we should
use some type of double-deflatedprice index. This is because the changingprices of raw material
used in domestic productionare irrelevantfor analyzing import competition, given the world
market price for raw materials that must be paid by both domestic and foreign producers.
Although the Bartelsman-Graydatabase does not provide such an index, I could calculate a
proxy to use as the variableto be explained.'2However,it turnsout that this refinementmakes
very little difference to the results.
The Stolper-Samuelson approachsuggests that two key variables explain the change in
domestic prices: (i) the degree of integrationof the domestic economy into the world markets
and (ii) domestic shocks such as productivitychanges. Although integrationand importpenetrationare not synonymous, we would expect that changing integrationwould be mirroredby
changes in the ratio of net exportsto domestic consumption.Given this assumption,we predict,
for example, that domestic prices would fall with increasingnet import penetration.Given the
way in which I have defined the variables, this means that a positive relation exists between
domestic prices and the change in net exports. Falling domestic prices should also be related
to increases in total factor productivityof domestic producers.That is, the faster the growth of
domestic productivity,the relatively lower the increases in price.
I assume that changes in net exportslead to a change in domestic prices. It is also possible
that the reverse causation is at work, that is, that changes in domestic prices lead to a change
in net exports. However, this would come about mainly as a result of a change in technology.
The variablethat indicateschanges in total factorproductivityis a good proxy for technological
change, and its inclusion among the explanatoryvariables in the regression is important.The
10For example,Lawrenceand Slaughter(1993) use an earlierversionof the NBER databasethanI employ.Nevertheless,
they identify skilled and unskilled labor with nonproductiveand productiveworkers.They carry out two exercises.
The first shows that relative wages of the two types of labor and the relative share of nonproductiveand productive
workersdid not change in the mannerpredictedby the Stolper-Samuelsontheorem. (However,this exercise raises
some problems because the Stolper-Samuelsontheorem assumes a constant technology.) The second explores the
relationshipbetweenchanges in exportand importprices to the ratioof nonproductionto productionworkersin various
industriesat differentlevels of aggregation.
In my discussion,I use domesticpricesratherthantradepricesbecausethe formerare morerelevantto the problem
of domestic wages and employment.However,in the next section I do considerforeign prices. Moreover,in both this
section and the next, where I look at tradeprices, I try to hold certainotherkey factorsconstant,which Lawrenceand
Slaughterdo not do.
The price changes should reflect changes on the supply ratherthan the demandside. This is because the periodunder
examinationcovers 20 years, and over this perioddomesticproducershad the time to adjustto any such demandshifts.
It might be addedthatbecause the sampleconsists of all manufacturingindustries,the price variablecan be interpreted
as the relativeprices in comparisonto the entire producerprice index.
12 For 1991, I deflatedthe value of raw materials
(includingenergy) by the appropriateprice index and the sum of the
materialsand value addedby the price index for shipments.This yielded an estimate of the deflatedvalue addedthat
I then comparedwith value added in 1971 in currentprices to calculate a price index. On a four-digitlevel, such a
calculationgave reasonableresults for all but five commoditygroups, which were droppedfrom the sample.
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other factors underlyingdomestic price changes, which lead to changes in trade, appearrelatively unimportantand can be excluded from furtherconsideration.13
The regressions, presented in Table 2, have a high degree of explanatory power. The
calculated coefficient for the variable that representschanges in domestic productivityhas the
correct sign and is statistically significant. Nevertheless, in none of the six regressions is the
calculated coefficient that links the change in net exports to the change in domestic prices
statistically significant.'4Indeed, on a four-digitlevel the sign of the calculatedregression coefficient is incorrect.5S
Moreover,the value of the coefficient that relates changes in net exports
to price changes becomes increasinglysmaller as the level of disaggregationincreases. Therefore, with even more disaggregateddata, we might expect that the regression results would
provide even strongerevidence against the hypothesis.
Therefore,in the variousbranchesof manufacturing,such results suggest that importcompetition has not resulted in a significantlowering of domestic prices. In other words, the evidence for the operationof a mechanismwhereby importpenetrationlowers domestic prices and
wages in the affected industriesappearsweak. This means that althoughtrade might have had
some influence for the relative decline in employment of particularunskilled-labor-intensive
industries,it is difficult to assign any majorrole to importpenetrationfor falling relativeprices
or wages in these industriesin the long term.16
Downwardpressureson prices and wages have occurredin productionbrancheswith high
unskilled-laborintensities, but these price pressures arise from domestic circumstances.This
can be easily shown by adding to the regressionsin Table 2 several independentvariablesthat
representunskilled labor and the labor-capital ratio. When the change in net exports is held
constant, the calculated regression coefficients show a statisticallysignificantdownwardprice
pressure in labor-intensiveor non-skilled-intensiveindustriesratings, at least at the four-digit
level. Such a phenomenoncould come about for several reasons. For example, on the supply
side it could arise in highly competitive industriesif the wages of unskilled labor are falling
for reasons having nothing to do with foreign trade, such as skill-biased technical change.17
The same two objections can be raised against these statisticalexercises as could be made
My inclusion of the domestic productivityvariableis also based on the assumptionthatprices in the United States are
not the same as world prices and that importedand domestic goods can be imperfectsubstitutesfor each other.
141 also repeatedthe experimentsreportedin footnote 7 for the regressionsin Table 2. In all cases, the coefficients of
determinationwere relativelyhigh because of the key role of total factor productivitychanges. For importsas a share
of domestic consumption,domesticprice changes (gross) of shipments(but not the double-deflatedprice changes)were
significantlyand negatively relatedat the three- and four-digitlevel. Moreover,at the three-digitlevel, total tradewas
also negatively and significantlyrelatedto domestic price changes (gross) but not to the double-deflatedprice changes.
Althoughseveralinterpretationsof these differenceswith the regressionsusing net exportscan be offered,moreresearch
is requiredfor a definitive answer.
15
Unweightedregressionswith value of shipmentsas the weights yield roughlythe same results,except at the three-digit
level, where the calculatedcoefficient of the net export variablefor the regressionwith the double-deflatedprices of
domestic shipmentsis not statisticallysignificantat the 0.05 level.
16 Revenga (1992) presents data on price elasticities of importedgoods, showing that importedgoods falling in price
replace domesticallyproducedgoods. Althoughthis is undoubtedlytrue, I am dealing with a differentproblem.
17 Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1997) have an
interestingtable that shows a relative fall in prices of internationally
traded goods that are unskilled-laborintensive. However, this could occur for reasons having nothing to do with
internationaltradeper se.
On the demand side, a fall in net exports might induce a deflationarymonetaryor fiscal policy to forestall any
balance of paymentscrisis. This in turn would lead to a general rise in unemployment.Because less skilled workers
have more volatile unemploymentrates than the more skilled, the fall in net exports would be associated with a
differentialrise in the unemploymentof less skilled workersand greaterdownwardpressureon their wages.
13
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against the results in the previous table. Namely, such an analysis does not take into account
either the defensive measures of industriesfacing potential import competition or the heterogeneity of importedand domestically producedproductsleading to noncompetingimports. In
the following two sections, I look directly at these objections and, to relieve the suspense, find
little evidence that these factors are very important.

5. Effects of Potential Import Competition on Investment and Increased Skills
of the Labor Force
Wood (1994, 1995) emphasizes that domestic producers are not passive in the face of
actual or potentialimportcompetition.To meet this threat,they can, for example, increasetheir
rate of technical change, upgradetheir labor force, or substitutecapital for labor.Contraryto
the assumptionunderlyingthe previous analysis, this means that causation runs from trade to
change in the capital-labor ratio or skill intensity ratherthan the reverse. The signs of these
relationships,independentof the causal direction,are the same.
Because the regressionsreportedin Table 1 show little relationbetween changes in trade
ratios and changes in eitherthe capital-laboror the skill-intensityratio, we might readilydismiss
such an idea. However,the theoreticalargumentsused by Wood are sufficiently strong that the
hypothesis deserves more serious attention.
Testing whetherproducersin those domestic branchesof productionthat face potentialor
actual import penetrationare especially likely to take defensive measures raises some serious
problems,and the approachadoptedis straightforwardbut crude. I examine whetherthe annual
average increases in such variablesas the labor-capitalratio, the total factor productivityrate,
and the upgradingof the laborforce are relatedin the expected mannerto such initial conditions
as the labor-capitalratio or the share of less skilled workers,as Wood's hypothesis would lead
us to believe. This type of test does not account for scale effects, various kinds of subtle
substitutioneffects, and changes in profits,18but it has the advantage of providing a useful
overview of the major effects that we would expect.
The results, presentedin Table 3, can be readily summarized.The industrialbrancheswith
a high share of unskilled workersthat allegedly face actual or potentialimportcompetitiondo
not appearto have engaged markedlyin more defensive measures than other industries.More
specifically,the calculatedcoefficients for the variablerepresentingthe initial shareof unskilled
labor is not significantly related to any of the defensive measures. Although the regressions
provide some evidence of substitutionof capital for labor in those industrieswith initially high
labor intensity (high labor-capitalratios), the degree of explanatorypower is very low. Therefore, for both the upgradingof the labor force and the increase in total factor productivity,
Wood's hypothesis does not receive verification.
Variationson these statistical experimentsyield roughly similar results. If we substitute
into the regressions as a measure of unskilled labor the percentageof the labor force with a
high school educationor less in 1971 for the percentageof productionworkers,our conclusions
do not change. When the change in net exports is added to these regressionsas an independent
18

It would be useful to test whethercost-price marginshave also changed.However,I do not believe that the data are
sufficientlycomparablein the differentyears, especially with changes in the tax structure,to allow much confidence
to be placed in the results of such an exercise.
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variable, my basic conclusion does not change, nor does it when average pay is used as a
measure of labor skill.
In short, the industriesthat we might suspect would be most vulnerableto import penetration are not upgradingtheir labor force or increasingtheir productivityrelatively more than
other industries.This confirmsmy previous results, and the conclusions drawnin section 2 still
stand.

6. Product Heterogeneity and Noncompeting Imports
Wood's (1994, 1995) most interesting attack on the conventional wisdom about foreign
trade is also the most difficult to examine empirically.He argues that domestic productionand
import-competinggoods are often differentand thatdomestic manufacturersin the United States
do not now produce many goods purchasedfrom abroad.These are goods that are especially
unskilled-laborintensive and that would be prohibitively expensive to produce at the going
market wage for unskilled labor in the United States. For example, the United States imports
stuffed animals for children and produces many higher-techtoys domestically. However, such
an example should not imply that such low-skilled imports are only in a few branches of
industry. According to Wood, such unskilled-labor-intensivegoods appear in all branches of
productionand are not dominantin any particularbranchof industry.Therefore,the tests carried
out in the first two sections are, he would argue, beside the point.
To estimate the domestic labor displaced by such noncompetingimports,Wood develops
a counterfactualscenarioin five steps: (i) He looks at the tradebetween the developing countries
(South) and the industrialnations (North) to determinethe embodied domestic factors (capital,
high-skilled labor,and low-skilled labor)of these goods. (ii) He estimates,by use of an assumed
productionfunction, what the factor content of the exports of the South to the North would
have been had the factor prices been the same as in the North. This is the counterfactual
technology estimate that he uses to determinewhat factors would have been employed had the
North needed to produce these goods domestically. (iii) He estimates what trade between industrial and developing countries would have been had the South traded only its traditional
exports (primaryproducts)with the North. Of course, the South would then have been limited
by these trade receipts to imports financed by receipts from their traditionalexports, namely,
primaryproducts.This is the counterfactualtradeestimate. (iv) He estimatesthe changes in the
domestic productionpatternin the industrialcountries that would have occurred.He accounts
for price differences in the noncompetingimportsfrom the South so that a dollar of (high-cost)
domestic productioncorrespondsto less than a dollar's worth of these noncompetingimports,
which, under the counterfactualtrade estimate, are no longer importedfrom the South. This is
the counterfactualoutput estimate. (v) By combining the counterfactualtechnology and output
estimates,he determinesthe unskilledlaborin the North displacedby the tradein noncompeting
imports from the South.
According to Cooper (1997), this is "a highly sophisticatedanalysis on the basis of weak
data combined with thoughtfuljudgments." However,Cooper also notes that in developing his
counterfactualsWood fails to allow for the possibility that demandfor these formerlynoncompeting imports from the South would be very much lower because of their price. That is, their
labor content, combined with high wages in the North, would raise their domestic price considerably and as a result would be neither domestically producednor domestically purchased.
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Table 3. Defensive Measures Takenin IndustrialBranchesFacing Potential or Actual Import
Penetration,1971-1991
Constant

Labor-CapitalRatio,
1971

Percentageof Production Coefficientof
Determination(R2)
Workers,1971

Sample Size

DependentVariable:Average Annual Change in the Labor-CapitalRatio
Two-Digit IndustrialClassification
-0.0294
-0.0940
+0.0098
0.0552
20
(0.0226)
(0.0944)
(0.0325)
Three-DigitIndustrialClassification
-0.0335*
-0.0626
71
+0.0136
0.0286
(0.0098)
(0.0521)
(0.0138)
Four-DigitIndustrialClassification
-0.0406
0.0082
-0.00066
-0.0254*
449
(0.0215)
(0.0043)
(0.00592)
DependentVariable:Average Annual Change in Percentageof ProductionWorkers
Two-Digit IndustrialClassification
-0.0125
-0.0242
0.1149
20
+0.0144
(0.0100)
(0.0069)
(0.0289)
Three-DigitIndustrialClassification
-0.0159
71
-0.00815*
+0.00823
0.0478
(0.00332)
(0.0176)
(0.00466)
Four-DigitIndustrialClassification
-0.00708*
-0.00621
+0.00670*
0.0379
449
(0.00116)
(0.00585)
(0.00161)
DependentVariable:Average Annual Change in Total FactorProductivity
Two-Digit IndustrialClassification
+0.0124
+0.0622
-0.0166
0.1670
20
(0.0148)
(0.0617)
(0.0213)
Three-DigitIndustrialClassification
71
+0.00399
+0.0325
-0.00536
0.0175
(0.00850)
(0.00606)
(0.0321)
Four-DigitIndustrialClassification
+0.00284
+0.00959
-0.00188
0.0009
449
(0.00340)
(0.01715)
(0.00472)
Standarderrorsare in parenthesesbelow the estimatedregressioncoefficients; statisticalsignificanceat the 0.05
level is indicatedby asterisks.The averagevalue of shipmentsserve as weights. For other notes, see Table 1.

This means that Wood's estimatesfor the labordisplacementis much too high. Freeman(1995)
and Cline (1997) level other valid objections to some of Wood's assumptionsand estimation
methods.
Empiricallydeterminingthe impact of noncompetingimports on factor demand requires
not only a series of assumptions,many of which can be questioned, but also highly detailed
and comparabledata on trade and production.These statistics would allow us to distinguish
trade and productionof different qualities of particulargoods. Unfortunately,we do not have
such data and by necessity must adopt shortcuts.
I try one such shortcutto this disaggregationproblemin the firsttwo sections of this paper,
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namely, by extrapolatingtrendsin the calculatedregressioncoefficients as the statisticalexperiments are carried out on increasingly detailed data. The results suggest that at highly disaggregated levels of trade and production,the skill intensity of productiondoes not explain very
much and thereforethat the impact of noncompetingimports should not be great.
Sachs and Shatz (1994) try two other shortcutsto test Wood's hypothesis by using U.S.
trade data disaggregatedby tradepartners.First, if domestic industriesare hard hit by imports
from the South, they should drop those lines of productionthat are especially unskilled-labor
intensive so that their average skill intensity of productionrises. Sachs and Shatz test for this
phenomenon and find no such trends. Second, defensive measures in those industries with
considerableimportpenetrationfrom developing nations should be greaterthan in other industries. Their approachis similar to that surroundingmy discussion for Table 3, but with an
exclusive focus on trade with the South. In particular,they explore whether total factor productivity rose more in those industrialsectors in which trade penetrationfrom the South was
greatest, especially as those sectors would be shedding the lowest-productivityworkers in an
attemptto meet such foreign competition.Although they find such an effect, it is small, and it
occurredonly in the period 1978-1989.
A more direct way of approachingthis problemis to examine differencesin price changes
of tradedgoods and of domestic production.If the import competitionhypothesizedby Wood
is becoming increasinglyimportant,averageprices of importedgoods should fall relative to the
average prices of domesticallyproducedgoods. This is because the latterwould be increasingly
focused on producinggoods at the high end of the market.
Therefore,we need only comparethe price indices of importedand domesticallyproduced
goods to see whether this is occurring.Fortunately,the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics does
calculate separateand comparableprice indices for imported,exported, and domestically produced goods arrangedaccordingto their SIC codes. Unfortunately,the sample is not as large
as we would hope, so the results must be interpretedcautiously. Using certain assumptions,
these data can yield some limited informationthat is relevant to the problem. First, however,
we must directly face three additional,serious difficulties.
1. The "average price" problem: A major difference between unit-value price indices often
used for foreign trade series and the price indices used for productionconcerns the ability
of the index to distinguish a pure price change from the upgradingof the quality of the
goods purchasedthat is reflected in a higher unit value. Nevertheless, unless a price index
includes every single quality of every good as a separatecommodity in the index, some of
the price increases measuredby the index really reflect a quality upgrade(associatedwith a
higher price) of the various goods in the index. The Bureau of Labor Statistics calculates
both tradeand productionindices on a productbasis so that we can readilycomparedomestic
and foreign prices. Although a relatively rising domestic price could reflect higher prices for
the same goods by domestic markets,the lack of a complex spectrumof qualities of goods
in the indices could also mean that the domestic producersare upgradingthe quality of their
goods and, as a result, charginghigher prices ratherthan charginghigherprices for the same
quality of goods. I interpretpart of the divergence of domestic and foreign prices in this
manner.
2. The time-period problem: These comparableprice indices are available only for a period
that in most cases spans a period from the early and middle 1980s to the early 1990s.

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 20:14:39 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

486

Frederic L. Pryor

Moreover, the starting and ending dates of the various series are different. Considerable
statisticalnoise can also occur in such short time series.
3. The problem of changes in the value of the currency:Because the 1980s was a period of
dramaticappreciationand depreciationof the dollar,it is necessary to hold the real exchange
rate constant in making any calculations for the different series. Such a task requirescalculating an index of the real exchange rate and, from such data, including with each set of
price changes a change in the real exchange rate for the same period.19
By including a variable that reflects the changes in the real exchange rate, a problem of
variable markupsarises. If, for example, trade markupsremainedconstant,the domestic price
of imported goods would fluctuate according to the exchange rates. If, by way of contrast,
foreign exportersprice to the U.S. market,their prices would remain constant in U.S. dollars,
but their markupswould vary accordingto the exchange rate. However,pricing to the market
means that the price of particulargoods varies between nations and opens up the possibility of
arbitrageof these tradedgoods. As a result, pricing to the marketis necessarilyincomplete.For
the regressionspresentedin the following discussion, this means that the calculatedcoefficient
for the exchange rate variable incorporatesboth the revaluationof the currencyand the variability of the marketsinduced by such currencyrate changes.
In the regression experiments presented in Table 4, the variable to be explained is the
change in the ratio of importsto total domestic consumptionof the good. I also experimented
with changes in the export ratio and the total trade ratio but report only the import results
because they are most relevantto Wood's argument.
The first explanatoryvariable is the difference between the annual rise in import prices
and prices of domestic productionfor each particularcategory of goods. If import prices rise
in comparisonto domestic prices, import penetrationshould decline, so that the hypothesized
relationshipis negative. The second explanatoryvariable is the change in the real exchange
rate, which rises as the dollar depreciates(foreign goods become more expensive). If the real
exchange rate depreciates,import penetrationshould decline, and the calculatedregressioncoefficient should also be negative. I calculate the regressions at various levels of aggregationto
determinethe impact of aggregation.
The regressionresults in Table 4 are disappointingbecause the two independentvariables
do not have much explanatorypower. Indeed, only at the highest level of disaggregationis the
coefficient for the real exchange rate statistically significant and, moreover,with the correct
sign. The estimated coefficients linking changes in import penetrationto differences in the
averageannualchange in importand domestic prices are not statisticallysignificant,and, moreover, all have the wrong sign.
I also experimentedwith a series of other explanatoryvariables that might be necessary
'9 The available indices are not satisfactoryfor this purpose,and it proved necessary to calculate such a special index

for this purpose.For the exchange rate weights, I startedwith a sample of nations whose trade amountedto at least
0.5% in 1980, 1985, 1990, or 1995. Eliminatingthose for which exchange rate or price data were not available, I
calculatedthe average trade share in the four years. The final index included 29 countrieswhose trade covered 81%
of U.S. trade turnover.I then collected exchange rates for the dollar, deflating each by a producerprice index, a
wholesale price index, or a manufacturingprice index, whicheverwas available.
The volume of trade used as the weights are mainly from the InternationalMonetaryFund'sDirection of Trade
Statistics Yearbook(variousyears) and some miscellaneoussources,includingRepublicof China(1996). The exchange
rate data are mainly from InternationalMonetaryFund (1996) but also from certain additionalstatisticalsources for
particularcountries.
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Table 4. RelationshipBetween the Change in Importsand Differences in the Changeof Import
and Domestic Prices, 1971-1991
Constant

Difference in Average
Annual Change in Import
and Domestic Prices

Change in Real
ExchangeRate

Coefficientof
Determination(R2)

Sample Size

DependentVariable:Change in the Ratio of Importsto Domestic Consumption,1971-1991
Two-Digit IndustrialClassification
0.0016
18
-1.482
+0.131
+0.0488
(13.114)
(2.364)
(0.3089)
Three-DigitIndustrialClassification
0.0771
49
+1.995
+0.516
+0.0812
(1.113)
(0.390)
(0.0238)
Four-DigitIndustrialClassification
0.1744
36
+1.124
-3.327*
+0.105*
(1.275)
(0.650)
(0.021)
Standarderrors are in parenthesesbelow the calculated coefficients; statistical significance at the 0.05 level is
indicatedby asterisks.The tradedata come from sourcescited in Table 1. The real exchangerate calculationis described
in footnote 10. Sources: The producerand import prices come from the Web. The producerprices come from http://
stats.bls.gov/ and thereafterby selecting data, gopher, time-series, and producerprices. The foreign trade price series
and thereafterby selecting historical series. These foreign trade price
come from http://stats.bls.gov:90//ipphome.htm
series are also containedin the CD-ROMaccompanyingFenestra(1996).

to hold constant to isolate the impact of differentialprice effects. These included the average
annual growth of total factor productivityand of the domestic consumptionof the category of
good, both for the relevant periods and for each good. These did not markedly affect either
calculated coefficient for the differentialprice variable.Because I am not focusing on specific
characteristicsof the industrialbranches,it is not necessary to include variables that indicate
the relative importanceof unskilled labor in the various branches,as in the first three tables of
this paper.
In sum, these statistical experimentsprovide no evidence that imports are sweeping the
low end of the various productmarkets,as is arguedby Wood. One could add one theoretical
supportfor such negative results:It is truethatmost low-qualitygoods thatuse highly unskilledlabor-intensivemethods are produced domestically only in very small quantitiesbecause the
high labor costs would have made them expensive in relation to their quality. However, as the
incomes of consumersrise, consumers are also unlikely to buy such goods if those goods are
imported. Rather, consumers turn increasingly toward goods of higher quality (and prices),
which might or might not be producedabroad.
Given the fact that none of the other attemptsreportedabove could show evidence for the
noncompetingimports to have a major impact, the most importantconclusion of the first two
sections of this paper still stands:Foreign tradedoes not appearto have had a direct and major
impact on the employmentrates of unskilled U.S. workers.

7. If Not Trade, What Is to Blame?
Although the regressionanalysis provides insight into causation,it does not allow us easily
to gain an idea of how many unskilledworkershave been displacedby tradeor by otherpossible
causes, such as a change in the patternof domestic consumption.It is simplest to approachthis
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problem by first looking at the changes occurringin trade and productionby means of comparisons between the currentsituationand a series of counterfactuals.Then we can investigate
the relativeimportanceof externaland internalcauses in bringingaboutsome of these changes.20
A simple shift-shareanalysis gives us the clearest view of the changes between 1971 and
1991. The object of the exercise is to determinewhat part of the changes in the employment
of workersof different levels of educationcan be tracednot only to changes in the patternof
trade but also to two competing hypotheses: (i) shifts in the patternof consumptionand (ii)
shifts in employment patterns within specific industries. The method requires constructinga
series of counterfactualsin which these factors did not change and comparingthese with actual
changes in the employmentof workersof differentlevels of education.21
Part A of Table 5 shows that although manufacturingproductionhas more than doubled
between 1971 and 1991, employmentdeclined 4.5%. This is mostly due to the dramaticincrease
in labor productivity.If the share of exports and imports had remainedthe same so that production would have grown as fast as domestic consumption (taking trade into account), the
manufacturinglabor force would have declined only 3.3%. The 1.2 percentagepoint difference
is due to the increasedimbalanceof tradein manufacturingin the two years underexamination.
Part B of Table 5 uses disaggregateddata and simulates three scenarios.In the first statistical experiment,I allow the structureof consumptionto change as it did between 1971 and
1991. However, I hold constant in all 77 industriesthe share of exports and imports and the
shares of workers with different educationalqualificationsfor all industries.In the second experiment,I allow the structureof tradeto change as it did between 1971 and 1991 while holding
the other two variables constant. In the third experiment,I allow the distributionof workers
between differenteducationalgroups to vary while holding the other two variablesconstant.
For all four educationalgroups, the economy-wide changes in the educationallevels of
workers employed in each industry account for almost all the actual changes of employment.
By way of contrast,shifts in the patternof trade or consumptionaccount for very little of the
change in employmentof workers with different educationalqualifications.Such a result parallels the regressionexercise in Table 1. Indeed,except for high school dropouts,the tradeeffect
acts in the opposite direction as the actual change in employment. As noted in the discussion
about Table 1, these results offer no supportfor the hypothesis that domestic manufacturersin
general have met importcompetitionby outsourcingabroadthose partsof theirproductionthat
are especially unskilled-laborintensive.
20This is a variantof the standardembodied-factor
approachused, for example, by Borjas, Freeman,and Katz (1992,
21

1996).
Essentially,this is the same approachas thatfollowed by Sachs and Shatz (1994). However,they use a 51-sectorinputoutputtable to determineboth the direct and the indirectamountsof workersat differentskill levels that are affected
by trade.They assume that if the net importsof electric pumpsincrease,the workersin the domestic industriesmaking
the metal, motors,measuringgauges, and otherinputsused by the pumpmanufacturershouldalso be takeninto account
in determiningthe impact of trade. I discuss some of the dangers in using input-outputcalculationsfor long time
periodsin section 1.
For the pump manufacturer,my approachaccounts for any decline in employmentin the metal-working,motor,
and instrumentindustriesonly in terms of what is happeningto total productionin these separateindustries.In other
words,in my counterfactual,I assumethatthe consumptionpattern(domesticusage in each industrybut not necessarily
final consumption)in 1991 was the same as in 1971. In their counterfactual,Sachs and Shatz assume that the final
consumptionpatternin 1990 was the same as in 1978. Their counterfactualalso assumes that interindustryrelations
and outsourcingremainedthe same. My counterfactualallows for changes and can account for the fact that a multinational might ship U.S. instrumentsto its foreign electric pump factory for those pumps that were exportedto the
United States.
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Table 5. Trade,Production,and Employmentof Workerswith Different Levels of Education
PartA: AggregativeAnalysis for Changes in Manufacturing,1971-1991
Percentage
Change

Actual change in domestic shipmentsof manufacturedgoods
Actual change in manufacturinglabor force
Hypotheticalchange in manufacturinglabor force if domestic shipmentshad increased at the same rate as consumptionof manufacturedgoods

+ 102.6%
-4.5
-3.3

PartB: Changes in ManufacturingEmploymentby Level of Education,1971-1991

Structureof
Consumption

Share of
Trade

Force
~Labor
LaborForce
Structure,
Defined by
Highest Level
High
of Formal
School
Education
Dropouts

Highest Level of FormalEducation

High
School
Diploma

HypotheticalChanges
Constant Constant -20.6% +8.0%
Changed
Constant
-3.3
Changed Constant -4.9
Constant
Constant Changed -54.5
+13.3
Actual changes
-57.1
+10.6

Some
University
or Trade/
Vocational
School

University
Degree

+59.2%
-2.7
+63.6

+66.0%
-1.9
+92.7

+66.3

+101.6

Total

+6.1%
-3.8
-3.3
-4.5

The data on educationallevels of workerscome from the March CurrentPopulationSurveys for the respective
years. Because the Census Bureauuses a somewhatdifferentindustrialnomenclaturethan the BEA, for each industryI
applied the percentagedistributionof workersby educationalgroups derived from the census data to the BEA data on
employment.The tradeand manufacturingshipmentsby three-digitSIC classificationcome from Feenstra(1996, 1997).
Data about prices, employment,and other aspects of the same industriescome from Bartelsmanand Gray (1996). For
this discussion, I assume that the change in shipmentsrepresentsthe change in productionfor the 20-year interval.

At most, the balance-of-tradeeffect is equal to a 1.2 percentage point decline in actual
employment.This is because closing the tradedeficit does not necessarily mean that domestic
output would have expanded because it also could have come about by a decline in domestic
expenditures.As a result, it is difficultto say exactly what the total effect on employmentwould
have been without the trade deficit. Nevertheless, the trade deficit effect would still be small,
and any "great sucking sound" of a trade-inducedoutflow of U.S. jobs abroad seems faint
indeed.
No dearth of alternatecandidates exists to explain the falling employment rates of less
skilled workers, especially males. The most popular explanationamong economists is biased
technical change, which positively shifts the demand curve for skilled labor and negatively
shifts the demandcurve for unskilled labor.For example, Berman,Bound, and Griliches(1994)
provide data on the upgradingof the labor force from productionto nonproductionworkersin
every major industry as evidence to argue this case. In a later paper, Berman, Machin, and
Bound (1996) claim that this is a worldwide phenomenonas well.
Surely, no one will deny that the labor force in most industrialnations is being upgraded.
Nevertheless, this can come about because of an increase in the education of the workersthat
is quite independentof whethertechnical change has taken place. A simple exercise is to take
the 500 occupations in 1971, classify them according to the average education in each occupation, and examine the change in the numberof people in each occupationalgroup by 1991.
Because the occupationalnomenclaturechangedin the early 1980s, it is necessary to take special
measuresusing a probabilisticmappingfrom one set of codes to the other,describedin tedious
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detail in Pryor and Schaffer (1997). Such a calculation,noted in the introductionof this paper,
shows that the number of jobs available in occupations requiringa high school education or
less has increasedconsiderablyfasterthanthe numberof people with these low educationlevels.
Using a much differentkind of analysis, Howell (1997) arrivesat the same conclusions.
Although most of these jobs have not experienced an upgradingin their qualifications,
they are now being filled by those who have more than a high school education.For example,
"grader,dozer, and scrapermachine operators"had 2.5 more years of educationin 1991 than
in 1971, and the averageprime-ageworkerin this occupationnow has more than a high school
education,althoughthe additionaleducationdoes not seem justified by changes in the requirements for thesejobs. More evidence on these matterscan be found in Pryorand Schaffer(1998).
In sum, althoughskill-biased technical change might be occurring,it is not responsiblefor the
rise in joblessness among less skilled prime-agemales.
Other explanationsfor the employmentdecline of less skilled workers are also available.
Pryor and Schaffer (1998) show that a displacementeffect has occurredin the job structure,
with more educated workers bumping less educated workers out of particularjobs and these
displaced workersbumpingeven less educatedworkersout of theirjobs. This bumpingmechanism can be easily documentedand has some depressingimplications.For example,downward
wage pressure is strongest among the least educated, who, moreover,are most likely to get
totally pushed out of the labor force. For reasons Schaffer and I discuss elsewhere, this mechanism is especially importantin explaining trendsin male employmentrates.

8. A Brief Summary
Classical trade theory sees no impact of foreign trade on domestic unemploymentother
than short-termeffects as workers move from one industry to another.The Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem suggests that if joblessness did arise from foreign trade, in the United States, which
has an abundanceof capitaland skilled labor,it would occur amongthe least educated.Although
U.S. unemploymentin the mid-1990s is relatively low, the share of the male prime-age (ages
25-49) labor force that is not included in the labor force has risen considerablyover the last
quartercentury so that total joblessness in this group now runs about 11%.Further,the jobless
rates are very much higher among the less educatedthan the more educated.
Using a regression analysis, the first part of this paper shows that the changing share of
net exports (or net imports)to domestic productionin particularindustriesis not relatedto the
relative importanceof less educatedworkersin that industrialbranch.A regressionanalysis in
the second part of this paper shows that those industrieswith especially large shares of less
educated workers have not experienced any relative decline in domestic price due to import
penetration,a result offering furtherevidence that these industriesare not, in general,especially
vulnerableto import competition and that we must look elsewhere for the causes underlying
the high joblessness of the less educated. These results also do not seem contaminatedby
defensive measures undertakenby producersin industrialbranches with high shares of less
educatedworkersin their labor force.
However, this type of analysis does not directly face the critiqueof Wood in his analysis
of noncompeting imports and quality differences between exports and imports in the same
industrialbranch.Unfortunately,the data used in this paperdo not allow a definitive answerto
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this question, but the detailed evidence brought forward offers little support to Wood's hypothesis.
Other explanations for the upward trend in the joblessness of less educated workers can
be offered, for example, skill-biased technical change. This paper presents evidence about the
changing occupational structure in the United States that appears to contradict the technicalchange approach. The essay ends with a sketch of a different and more promising approach
that relies on the changing occupational structure in the United States and the downward occupational mobility whereby an increasing number of university graduates are taking "high
school jobs" and those with a high school diploma jobs previously held by high school dropouts,
so that the latter are bumped out of the labor force.
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